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Smart cards are being increasingly used for
payment, having been issued across most of
Europe, and they are in the process of being
implemented elsewhere. These systems are
almost exclusively based on a global standard –
EMV (named after its designers: Europay,
Mastercard, Visa)1 – and commonly known as Chip
& PIN in the United Kingdom. Consequently, the
reliability of the Chip & PIN system, and the
evidence it generates, has been an increasingly
important aspect of disputes between banks and
their customers. A common simplification made
by banks when deciding whether to refund a
disputed transaction, is the assertion that cloned
smart cards will be detected, and that the correct
PIN must be entered for a transaction to succeed.
The reality is more complex, so it can be difficult
to distinguish the difference between customer
fraud,2 a third party criminal attack, and customer
negligence. This article will discuss the situations
which may cause disputed transactions to arise,
what may be inferred from the evidence, and the
effect of this on banking disputes.
The replacement of magnetic stripe cards with smart
cards for credit and debit card payments has changed
the nature of disputes between banks and their
customers over unauthorized transactions. Previously
the operation and weakness of cards was well
understood, and there was ample evidence of criminal
practice. Now, with the implementation of Chip & PIN,
the situation has become uncertain: the system is much
more complex, the level of security is less clear, and
little is known about the capabilities of criminals in
terms of committing fraud. This complicates the task of
a bank in identifying whether a customer is entitled to
be refunded.
Chip & PIN offers greater resistance to fraud when
compared with the previous magnetic stripe system, and
unlike earlier domestic smart card payment standards, it
works across national boundaries. However, the
implementation is not infallible, and its complexity
increases the likelihood of flaws. In several respects there
has also been a trade-off between cost and security,
leading to the creation of weaknesses, some of which
have been exploited by criminals, some have been
demonstrated by researchers, and the remainder are
currently assumed to be merely theoretical.
Customers who notify their bank of unauthorized
transactions are often recompensed, but sometimes the
disputed transactions are not reversed. One possible
reason is that the bank believes that the customer
authorized the transaction, and is attempting to defraud
the bank by making a spurious complaint. Statistics on
this type of fraud are not publicly reported by the
banking industry, but a fraud investigator working for a
major bank, speaking under the Chatham House rule,3
did perceive that levels are high. For example, a group
of people have been accused of committing, with the
assistance of bank insiders, fraud in the region of
US$422,000, where they opened banks accounts and
then claimed their ATM cards had been lost or stolen,
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1 EMV Specifications for Payment Systems, available
at http://www.emvco.com/specifications.aspx.
2 The term ‘first-party fraud’ is used within the
banking industry to describe fraud by a customer.
3 The Chatham House Rule reads as follows: ‘When
a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the
Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use
the information received, but neither the identity
nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any
other participant, may be revealed. The Chatham
House Rule may be invoked at meetings to
encourage openness and the sharing of
information’: http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/
about/chathamhouserule/
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4 ‘Gang charged in $400,000 ATM scam’, Finextra
News, 31 July 2009, http://www.finextra.com/
fullstory.asp?id=20328. See also Stephen Mason,
editor, Electronic Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery &
Admissibility (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007),
4.04–4.15 for a discussion of cases regarding ATM
fraud and banking fraud across the world,
including insider fraud. The cases in this text pre-
date the introduction of Chip & PIN.
and that certain ATM withdrawals were not authorized
by them.4 The bank may alternatively believe that the
customer has acted negligently, in violation of the
account terms and conditions, by inadequately
protecting their card or PIN, or both their card and PIN.
If challenged over such a decision, arguably the bank
ought to be required to show that their position is
defensible, and that the transaction was not in fact
performed by a third-party criminal exploiting a security
vulnerability.
The bank’s decision will be based on the evidence
they have regarding the disputed transaction, the value
of the customer’s relationship with the bank, and the
perceived security of the Chip & PIN system. Much of
this evidence will be in digital form, and requires
processing and interpretation before it can be
understood. While this was also the case with magnetic
stripe payment cards, Chip & PIN increases the amount
of evidence that could be made available and its level of
complexity.
Almost all of this evidence will be held by the bank, as
is the information necessary to interpret it. Thus during
a dispute, if the bank is required or volunteers to give
this evidence to the customer, there will be questions as
how to verify the accuracy of the information, and what
conclusions can be safely drawn from a forensic
analysis. First, this article provides a simplified
introduction to Chip & PIN. Then the article sets out the
evidence created regarding transactions, and the
interpretation of the evidence is discussed to discover
whether and how card fraud has been performed.
Introduction
In addition to the visible security mechanisms – such as
the hologram, embossing, and fluorescent ink – UK
credit and debit cards incorporate a magnetic stripe.
This stores the data which is visible on the face of the
card (name, expiry date, card number, and such like). It
also holds the CVV (Card Verification Value; not to be
confused with the CVV2, which is printed on the
signature strip of the card). Prior to the use of Chip &
PIN, the data from the magnetic stripe would be read by
the point-of-sale (PoS) terminal or automated teller
machine (ATM) and sent to the bank that issued the
card to their customer (the card-holder). This bank (the
issuer) would be capable of verifying whether the CVV
they received corresponded to the one expected for that
particular card number. Thus, based only on information
which is visible on the card or a receipt, a criminal
should not be able to produce a cloned card which
evades detection.
The data read from the magnetic stripe only offers
assurance that the card is authentic. It is also necessary
to confirm that the genuine card-holder has authorized
the transactions. For PoS transactions, the cashier
would ask the customer for their signature, which they
can then compare to the one on the card. ATM
transactions are authorized by PIN. Here, the customer
enters their PIN at a keypad, which the ATM encrypts
and sends, along with the data from the magnetic
stripe, to the issuer, potentially via networks operated
by parties such as Visa, Mastercard, or VocaLink. The
bank can then compare the PIN entered with the one
stored in their records.
Magnetic stripe cards have well-known weaknesses.
Using commercially available equipment, it easy to read
details from the magnetic stripe of a card, including the
CVV, and write a perfect copy of it to a blank card. Such
a cloned card would work at an ATM, because only the
magnetic stripe is used. Criminals have exploited this
weakness in numerous ways, for example adding a
‘skimmer’ to ATMs, which records the magnetic stripe of
the card as it is inserted, and incorporates a camera to
record the PIN being entered. Together, this yields
enough information to make and use a clone in an ATM.
To use a clone in a PoS transaction, the visible security
features would also need to be copied, which takes
more effort but is well within the capabilities of
criminals, and has the advantage that the PIN is not
required.
The explanation above has been somewhat simplified
for brevity. In fact the authorization systems which verify
the CVV and PIN can be quite complex, consisting of
many components built and operated by different
parties; there will also be significant variation between
banks and even more between countries. It can be that
the issuer does not authorize the transaction at all, but
delegates this responsibility to a third party. Card and
PIN details are also likely to pass through several
different systems between the PoS terminal or ATM, and
the authorization system. However, despite this
complexity, the cards themselves use the same
technology as video and audio tapes, which means
there is good intuitive understanding of their main
security vulnerability – that if someone obtains
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possession of the card, even briefly, they can create a
perfect copy.
Chip & PIN
Chip & PIN was designed to mitigate vulnerabilities in
magnetic stripe cards, albeit with increased costs, as
well as requiring much infrastructure to be upgraded.
The cards include a magnetic stripe and the same
visible security features as before, but incorporate an
additional computer chip underneath the cards’ surface.
A terminal can interact with the chip through electrical
contacts on the face of the card. This chip is a computer
with processing power comparable to desktop
computers of the 1980s, but with additional security
functionality.
The chip has a program loaded into it, which is
designed to follow the communication conventions (a
protocol) specified by the EMV documentation, and so
be able to communicate with terminals that comply with
the EMV standard. This specification is complex,
consisting of several thousand pages, but there also will
be many thousands of additional pages which describe
the design of the chip and its software. National
industry bodies and industry members may also extend
the specification with additional material.
The chip performs three main operations: card
authentication (establishing that the card is authentic),
card-holder verification (establishing that the person
presenting the card is the authorized account holder),
and transaction authorization (establishing that there
are enough funds to complete the transaction and the
card is not cancelled).
Card authentication
The aim of card authentication is to allow the operator
of a PoS terminal (the merchant) to establish whether a
card presented is legitimate, without contacting the
issuer. This is important because in a small proportion
of UK PoS transactions, the terminal is ‘offline’ and does
not communicate with the issuer until after the
customer has left with the goods. However, since ATM
transactions should always be carried out online, card
authentication is not performed here. During card
authentication at the PoS, the card submits a
cryptographic certificate to the terminal, incorporating
the card’s account number and a digital signature. The
terminal can then check whether this certificate was
issued by a bank recognized by a payment system (e.g.
Visa or Mastercard) supported by the terminal, and
validate the digital signature.
Card-holder verification
Once the merchant is satisfied that the card is authentic,
both the card and merchant must be assured that the
person presenting the card is the legitimate account
holder. This is the role of card-holder verification, which
is normally achieved by using a PIN. The customer first
enters their PIN on a PIN entry device attached to the
PoS terminal or ATM. For PoS transactions, the PIN is
sent to the card and the card compares the PIN against
the one it stores, and returns the result of the
comparison to the terminal. If the PIN entered is
incorrect, the card will allow the PIN entry to be re-
attempted, but only up to a maximum number of tries –
normally three. For ATM transactions, the PIN is not sent
to the card, but encrypted and sent back to the issuer,
as with magnetic stripe transactions.
Transaction authorization
The final step is transaction authorization, where the
issuer, card, and merchant are assured that the card is
authentic, card-holder verification succeeded, the card
has not been cancelled, and there are adequate funds in
the customer’s account. Here, the terminal or ATM sends
the card a summary of the transaction (amount, date,
and such like). The card appends its own data, such as
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5 The details of the cryptography used are not
important for the purposes of this article, but for
further information on the design and use of
digital signatures and authentication codes, refer
to Ross J Anderson, Security Engineering, (2nd
edition, Wiley, 2008).
6 Sergei P. Skorobogatov, Semi-invasive attacks – A
new approach to hardware security analysis,
University of Cambridge Technical Report UCAM-
CL-TR-630, April 2005:
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-
630.html.
the result of card-holder verification, and also its
application transaction counter (ATC), which is a value
maintained by the card, counting how many
transactions have been initiated. The card then
responds with a cryptographic authentication code. For
offline transactions, the authentication code (the
transaction certificate – TC) is stored by the terminal for
later transmission to the issuer, and the transaction is
complete. However, for online transactions, the card
sends a different type of authentication code, an
authorization request cryptogram – ARQC. The ARQC is
sent to the issuer, and it responds with a message
stating whether the ARQC is valid, incorporating an
authorization response cryptogram – ARPC. Finally, the
ARPC is sent to the card for verification, and it responds
with a TC indicating that the transaction has succeeded.
Alternatively the card can at any time send an
application authentication cryptogram (AAC) which
means the transaction has been declined.
The issuer and card share cryptographic keys which
allow them to generate and verify the cryptographic
authentication codes (ARQC, ARPC, TC, and AAC). These
keys are loaded during its ‘personalization’ process.
However, the merchant does not have these keys, so
must rely on the issuer or card to perform the
verification. This is because the digital signature keys
used in transaction authorization are symmetric,
meaning that the same key is used for both generation
and verification, and so merchants could not be trusted
with the keys. In contrast, the cryptographic keys used
for card authentication are asymmetric, meaning that
one key is used for signature generation and another
key for signature verification, and it is infeasible to
convert the latter key into the former. Thus the
merchants are all given a verification key (the public
half), but the generation key (the private half) is kept by
the bank.5
Security failures in Chip & PIN
As noted above, the process of a Chip & PIN transaction
is much more complex than magnetic stripe
transactions. In fact the description above is a simplified
version, which shows how transactions should normally
happen in the UK; for a variety of reasons the process
may diverge from the steps above, and other countries
may have different procedures. This complexity is
largely for good reasons: the additional verification
catches more types of fraud, and so allows transactions
to proceed in situations where magnetic stripe cards
could not be safely used. However, the complexity also
increases the number of ways in which security failures
could occur, and makes it more difficult to establish
what has happened when they do. This section will
summarize some of the potential security vulnerabilities
in Chip & PIN, how they may come about, and what
their effect might be.
Card vulnerabilities
While magnetic stripe cards merely act as storage, the
security of Chip & PIN depends on the cards
implementing a set of security constraints, such as not
releasing cryptographic keys or the PIN, and performing
card-holder verification correctly. If, due to a bug in the
software running on the chip, it is possible to violate
these security constraints, criminals could exploit the
weakness to commit fraud. Even if the software is
correct, before a card can be used, it must be configured
during the personalization process. If there is a mistake
or oversight in this process, the card may be left in an
unlocked state in which some security constraints are
not enforced.
Criminals must discover the vulnerabilities in order to
exploit them. This may be achieved with the help of an
insider, who learns about the vulnerability after the
cards with the security vulnerability are already issued.
The insider may even create the security vulnerability
themselves, by interfering with the software or
configuration process, or by disclosing the
cryptographic keys needed to unlock a Chip & PIN card.
Alternatively criminals could discover vulnerabilities on
their own. One technique for doing so is ‘fuzzing’, where
an automated process is used to discover security
vulnerabilities. This does not need any knowledge of the
software being tested. Fuzzing has been widely used in
other contexts by both security researchers and
criminals, and is a very effective technique.
A further approach to compromising card security is
to attack the chip itself, rather than the software. One
set of techniques are known as invasive and semi-
invasive attacks, where the chip is removed from the
card and manipulated using laboratory equipment.6
These techniques can discover confidential information
or create carefully chosen failures in the enforcement of
security constraints. Non-invasive attacks are also
possible, which do not require the chip to be removed
from the card. For example, by measuring minute
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variations in the power consumption of smart cards, it is
possible to extract cryptographic keys.7 While smart
cards do commonly incorporate defences against
attacks, they are not always effective, and criminals
regularly use these techniques to clone the smart cards
used for subscription television.8
Regardless of how the criminal has discovered the
security vulnerability, if they can extract the card’s
cryptographic keys used for transaction authorization,
they can create a clone of the card which will be
undetectable to the bank systems. A criminal does not
need to know the correct PIN to use the cloned card for
PoS transactions, because the PIN is verified by the
card, and it can be programmed to accept any PIN.
Another way a criminal could use a card would be if the
correct PIN could be extracted from a card, or if the PIN
stored on the card could be changed without the
authorization of the issuer.
Other attacks against Chip & PIN do not require the
exploitation of security vulnerabilities at all, but rely on
inherent limitations of the cards. One such approach is
the ‘relay attack’, which makes use of the fact that
smart cards do not have a display to inform the card-
holder which transaction they are authorizing.9 The
attack works as follows: the card-holder inserts their
authentic card into a compromised Chip & PIN terminal,
and at approximately the same time, the criminal inserts
a special relay card into a real Chip & PIN terminal or
ATM. As the relay card is interrogated, it passes on
messages to and from the authentic card via the
compromised terminal. Thus the real terminal or ATM
will believe the relay card is authentic. The customer will
think they are authorizing one transaction, but actually
the criminal is carrying out a far larger one, potentially
on the other side of the world.
Personalization failures
It may not be necessary to compromise the card in order
to clone a card, because all the information needed is
available at the personalization bureau (where blank
cards have keys and customer data loaded), and at the
authorization centre (where transaction authorization
messages are sent). Personalization and authorization
are both performed on behalf of the issuer, but they are
commonly sub-contracted (in whole or in part) to
specialist service providers. If a criminal is able to
interfere with or extract information from either of these
processes, they could create a cloned card without
having seen the real one.
When considering disputed transactions, banks
commonly make the assumption that exactly one copy
of each card has been produced. Therefore, if bank
records show that the transaction authorization
succeeded, then they infer that the particular card
issued to the customer was used. The bank may then
consider the customer negligent for allowing their card
to be used without authorization, and therefore liable
for the transaction. However, the assumption that
cloned cards cannot exist is not valid, even if it is
assumed that the security vulnerabilities above, which
allow card cloning, cannot or have not been exploited.
This is because the personalization bureau must have
the ability to produce cloned cards, because the process
of personalization occasionally fails due to mechanical
problems. For instance, the personalization of the chip
may have failed, or the printing on the card may be
imperfect. An operator should notice the failure, and if
they do, they will request that a second card with the
same data be produced. Procedural controls should
ensure that the damaged card is destroyed, and all
cards are accounted for. If these procedures are
followed correctly, each customer should receive exactly
one card, which complies with quality assurance
standards.
However, these procedures occasionally fail. For
example, two bank customers have contacted the
author to inform him that they each received two
identical cards in the post. This is, presumably, due to a
technical or procedural failure at the personalization
bureau. The author has read the data from the chip on
these cards. In one case, both chips appear to contain
identical information, including cryptographic keys, and
therefore are perfect clones of each other. The customer
had used one of the cards successfully, but had not
used the second one. In the other case, one chip was
functional, but the other was not active. This customer
reported that he used both cards for successful Chip &
PIN transactions, so it could be that the bank eventually
7 Stefan Mangard, Elisabeth Oswald and Thomas
Popp, Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the
Secrets of Smart Cards, (2007, Springer-Verlag
New York, Inc.).
8 Kevin Poulsen, ‘DirecTV hacker sentenced to seven
years’, SecurityFocus, 10 December 2004,
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/10103; Kim
Zetter, ‘From the Eye of a Legal Storm, Murdoch’s
Satellite-TV Hacker Tells All’, Wired News, 30 May
2008 (Condé Nast Digital),
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2008
/05/tarnovsky.
9 Saar Drimer and Steven J. Murdoch, Keep Your
Enemies Close: Distance Bounding Against
Smartcard Relay Attacks, Proceedings of 16th
USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security
Symposium (2007, USENIX Association Berkeley,
CA, USA),
http://www.usenix.org/events/sec07/tech/drimer.ht
ml. A demonstration of the attack on a Chip & PIN
terminal was also filmed by BBC Watchdog, and
aired on 6 February 2007, 19:00, BBC One.
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10 Mike Bond and Ross Anderson, API-Level Attacks
on Embedded Systems, Computer, Volume 34,
Issue 10, (October 2001), 67–75, available at
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/API-
Attacks.pdf.
11 Kim Zetter, ‘PIN Crackers Nab Holy Grail of Bank
Card Security’, Wired News, 14 April 2009 (Condé
Nast Digital), http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2009/04/pins/.
12 Kevin Poulsen, ‘Citibank Hack Blamed for Alleged
ATM Crime Spree’, Wired News, 18 June 2008,
(Condé Nast Digital),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/06/citiban
k-atm-se/.
13 Steve Gold, ‘A PIN to go with that stolen card sir’,
IT Pro Portal, 16 August 2006,
http://www.itproportal.com/security/news/article/2
006/8/16/a-pin-to-go-with-that-stolen-card-sir/.
14 Sabina Wolf, ‘Sicherheitsrisiko EC-Karten: Wie
Banken mit geschädigten Kunden umgehen’,
Report MÜNCHEN, 15 June 2009, http://www.br-
online.de/das-erste/report-muenchen/report-
sicherheit-eckarten-ID1244812929699.xml.
noticed the cloned card and remotely de-activated it. In
both cases the cards were visibly identical, had the
same information recorded on the magnetic stripe, and
had the same details printed on the card, including the
CVV2.
In these cases no harm was done, because the
legitimate card-holder was sent both clones of the card.
However, these instances raise the possibility that a
malicious insider could trigger the issue of a cloned
card, and retain the cloned card in order to commit
fraud. Procedural controls are supposed to stop such
activity, but clearly they are not infallible, otherwise
cloned cards would not be seen. It is unclear what
caused the cloned cards to be sent to these customers,
because both had no visible problems. It was confirmed
that both chips in one pair worked correctly; for the
other pair, the chips presumably worked correctly,
otherwise they should not be able to complete
transactions. It could be that a software bug or human
error triggered the creation of clones, but another
possibility was that a malicious insider caused it, but
failed to intercept the clone before it was dispatched.
Attacks on hardware security modules
In both the personalization and authorization centres,
cryptographic keys and PINs are processed within
hardware security modules (HSM). These are computers
running specialized software, which will disable
themselves should unauthorized interference be
detected by their enclosure. Their storage capabilities
are limited, and it would be infeasible for them to store
separate cryptographic keys for every card that was
issued. Therefore a single master key is stored, and a
cryptographic procedure called ‘key derivation’ is used
to generate a different key for each card. The key
derivation procedure takes as input the master key and
identifying information of the card (account number,
sequence number), and produces a unique derived key
(UDK). The procedure is designed so that if a person did
find out the UDK for one or more cards, such knowledge
would not provide any help in discovering the UDK for
any other cards.
The security of HSMs is therefore of critical
importance to the integrity of Chip & PIN. In addition to
their tamper resistance, the software running in HSMs
must enforce security constraints, such as permitting
cryptograms to be verified, but not allowing
cryptographic keys to be extracted. However, the
complexity of the software has led to the discovery of
numerous security vulnerabilities. Initially these were
found only by academic researchers,10 but more recently
criminals have been exploiting security vulnerabilities in
order to commit fraud. In one case reported by Verizon,
criminals had extracted cryptographic keys from an
HSM and used these to decrypt customer PINs as they
were being processed, presumably at an authorization
centre.11 If it was possible for a criminal to extract the
cryptographic keys used during the personalization or
authorization process of Chip & PIN cards, they could
create undetectable cloned cards or discover the correct
PIN for a card, or both. For example, in February 2008,
Citibank reported to the FBI that one of their ATM
authorization systems was compromised by criminals,
account details collected, and US$750,000 of fraudulent
ATM transactions carried out.12
There have been persistent rumours of a system
sometimes termed ‘Bergamot’ which is claimed to allow
criminals to obtain the PIN for a stolen card. Neither the
operation nor the existence of such a device has been
verified, although reports of its use exist.13 A journalist
for ARD Germany also investigated 18 cases of
unauthorized ATM withdrawals committed in La Palma
in January 2005. In all cases the cards were stolen, but
the customers claimed that their PIN was not written
down. Nevertheless, the bank records show the correct
PIN was used, and the customers were considered
liable. One of the criminals responsible (they were
convicted in January 2009) was interviewed by a
journalist, but refused to say how they used the card
without a PIN. Files from the Guardia Civil assumed that
the criminals used a ‘dispositivo’ (device) to obtain the
PIN, but did not give further details.14
Design constraints of EMV
The discussion above has assumed that the
authorization system will always detect cloned cards
and an incorrect PIN. However, this is not always the
case; this section will describe some scenarios in which
the authorization system will fail to detect even
imperfect cloned cards. Some of the vulnerabilities
discussed below may be a consequence of errors made
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during design and implementation, which remained
undiscovered until the system was in use. However,
others may have been identified earlier, but permitted
to remain because the risk of the vulnerability was
perceived to be smaller than the cost to resolve it, after
other checks and balances were put in place. In
designing a system, the bank will try to find an
appropriate compromise by applying only those security
measures that will at least reduce fraud by their cost.
For example, cards issued in the UK are vulnerable to
attack in offline transactions, but the UK banks agreed
that the cost of the more secure cards would be higher
than the fraud they would resolve. This is because it is
cheaper to put high-value transactions online, and put
fraud detection algorithms in place. The problem from
the perspective of the customer is that these trade-offs
may not be known by the fraud investigation team. For
instance, while the weakness of UK cards in offline
transactions is well known, other vulnerabilities might
exist as a consequence of one department making a
cost saving, without informing other departments.
Cost-benefit trade-offs may have been considered
during the design of EMV if the vulnerability was
identified then, but if the vulnerability was discovered
during the implementation phase, a decision would
have been made not to fix it, because it was not cost
effective for the banks. Other vulnerabilities are not
inherent to all systems that implement EMV, but are a
property of a particular implementation; again, these
may be because of an oversight or due to a deliberate
design decision.
Static PIN
One inherent design decision in EMV is to use a single
PIN for the card, which must be entered in its entirety.
This means that if someone can see the PIN being
entered by the customer, and subsequently steals the
card, the criminal can easily commit fraud. Other
countries, for example Brazil, have adopted a different
approach. In addition to the PIN, an ATM prompts the
customer for a number of letters from a password. This
makes it unlikely that if a person is able to look over a
customer’s shoulder, that they will obtain enough
information to commit fraud.
It may also be possible for a criminal to guess the
right PIN for a card. From a single guess, if it is assumed
that every combination of PIN is equally likely, a thief
who steals a card has a 1 in 10,000 chance of guessing
the PIN (and perhaps even more because some PINs are
much more popular and the issuer may not permit
certain easy-to-guess combinations of numbers). But
the thief actually has six guesses because the card
permits three tries before the card will lock, and an ATM
will permit a further three, making the chance of
success 1 in 1,666. If the customer has multiple cards
with the same PIN (a practice recommended by banks to
prevent customers having to write down their PIN), the
odds for criminals can be even better. With four cards in
a stolen wallet, the thief could have five attempts on
each card without locking them, and thus have a 1 in
500 chance of finding the PIN, and if successful, they
will then be able to use all the cards.
These estimates are assuming that each card only has
one PIN which will be accepted. This is certainly the
case (assuming the card functions correctly) for PoS
transactions where the card verifies the PIN. However,
this is probably not the case for ATM transactions if the
PVV (PIN verification value) technique of verifying PINs
is used. This approach is used to reduce the risk that a
compromise of the authorization system will lead to
PINs being discovered. Rather than storing the PIN, the
customer’s PIN is encrypted and then truncated to 4
digits of ciphertext – the PVV. The PINs entered at the
keypad are also encrypted, truncated, and compared to
the PVV. If the correct PIN is entered, the two will match,
but if an incorrect PIN is entered, there is still a chance
of a match. Most cards will have two or more PINs which
will trigger a PVV match, and some will have as many as
ten.15
Yes cards 
During the process of card authentication, the card
presents a cryptographic certificate to prove that it is a
legitimate card. This certificate can be verified with
information which is available publicly, and therefore
can be carried out even by PoS terminals which are
offline. However, in order to allow anyone to verify the
certificate, the card must also permit anyone to read its
certificate and all the other information it presents.
Therefore anyone who can read the certificate can, for
most UK cards, produce a cloned smart card that will
present identical information, and so pass card
authentication. Criminals could produce such a clone by
reading data from a Chip & PIN card and writing it to a
15 Mike Bond and Jolyon Clulow, Encrypted?
Randomised? Compromised? (When
Cryptographically Secured Data is Not Secure),
Workshop on Cryptographic Algorithms and their
Uses, July 2004, (Queensland University of
Technology), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/
research/Enc-Rand-Comp.pdf.
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16 Dave Birch, ‘I didn’t want to write about fraud yet
again, but...’, Digital Money Forum, 15 October
2008, http://digitaldebateblogs.
typepad.com/digital_money/2008/10/i-didnt-want-
to.html.
17 Chris Mitchell, ‘Payment and e-commerce
applications (Part B2)’, Lecture notes for IY5601,
2005 (Royal Holloway, University of London),
http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/cjm/IY5601/IY5601_B_06
0205_83-156.pdf.
generic smart card. Equipment and software to achieve
this, along with programmable smart cards, are
commercially available, and cloned smart cards created
in this way have already been found in Europe.16
For PoS transactions, verification of the card-holder is
performed by the card. The terminal sends the PIN
entered to the card, and the card responds whether it is
correct. Therefore a criminal does not need to know the
correct PIN when using a cloned card, because clones
can be made which simply respond that any PIN is
correct – known as ‘Yes-Cards’. Clones such as this
would not contain the correct keys for generating the
ARQC or TC, and so could be detected by the issuer.
However, the TC is not sent to the bank until long after
the transaction for offline transactions, so by that stage
the thief will have left with the goods, although the
fraud can be detected afterwards. For online
transactions, the incorrect ARQC should be detected
and the transaction declined.
Copying the certificate to circumvent card
authentication, as described above, is possible in cards
which support static data authentication (SDA). As of
2009, most UK cards are of this type, but some banks
are distributing out a more secure alternative – dynamic
data authentication (DDA). This provides some
resistance against card cloning, but was not issued in
the UK, in part due to concerns about the increased
costs of the cards and longer transaction times. DDA
works by adding an additional step to card
authentication, where the card proves that it is the
legitimate owner of the certificate it presents. This
feature requires giving the card an asymmetric key
(both the public and private half), and the ability to
produce its own digital signatures, which is more
expensive, because asymmetric cryptography is much
more complex than the symmetric cryptography used in
transaction authorization.
The wedge attack
However, DDA does not prevent yes-cards completely,
because card authentication can occur before card-
holder verification, and so may not include the result of
the PIN verification. A simple yes-card cannot be used,
because it would fail card authentication, but an
alternative technique might still be effective against
offline transactions. Here, a stolen card is plugged into a
device (a ‘wedge’) that can modify the data as it flows
between the terminal and the card. The terminal is
permitted to communicate directly with the legitimate
card during card authentication, which will therefore be
successful. But during card-holder verification, the
wedge suppresses the messages as they are sent to the
card and, regardless of the PIN entered by the thief, the
wedge tells the terminal that the PIN was correct. The
wedge can either pass through the TC from the real
card, or create a fake one of its own. In this way, a
criminal who has stolen a Chip & PIN card (SDA or DDA)
can use it in offline transactions without knowing the
correct PIN.17
The wedge attack also works against online
transactions, due to an oversight in the design of the
transaction authorization stage. In the EMV
specification, the ARQC and TC message includes the
result of card-holder verification. However, the result
only indicates whether the verification was attempted
but failed; it does not distinguish between whether the
verification succeeded or whether it was not attempted.
Therefore a wedge could suppress card-holder
verification, and then relay the ARQC and TC between
the legitimate card and terminal. The issuer would
receive these cryptograms, and since they were from the
legitimate card, the authorization would succeed and
the bank would accept the transaction.
This flaw was eventually identified, and banks
produced a proprietary extension to EMV which
included an additional result in the ARQC and TC,
stating whether PIN verification was attempted; a
similar extension was later included in the revised EMV
specification, but has yet to be widely implemented.
However, these only allow the issuer to establish that
PIN verification was not attempted; in the wedge attack,
the merchant’s PoS terminal will still believe PIN
verification succeeded, even though the wrong PIN was
entered. A further extension – combined DDA and
application cryptogram generation (CDA) – can prevent
the wedge attack even in offline transactions by
combining card authentication and transaction
authorization, but this further extension has yet to be
adopted, at least in the UK.
Stand-in authorization
As noted in the discussion above, transaction
authorization is of critical importance: it is the only way
to reliably detect cloned cards and whether the correct
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PIN has been entered. Most transactions in the UK
(estimates of 80–90 per cent have been given) are
processed online. Despite this, the issuer may not
process the authorization message, because of the
possibility of ‘stand-in authorization’. Here, if the issuer
cannot be contacted in sufficient time, an intermediate
party such as the payment system or an outsourced
processing centre may authorize the transaction on
behalf of the issuer. The party that provides the
authorization is sometimes contractually obliged to
accept liability for the transaction if it is fraudulent.
However, if there is an equipment failure, it still may be
more cost-effective to authorize the transaction and
accept the risk without performing all the checks.
Issuers may not be aware of their own policy (or that of
any outsourced provider) on how authorizations are
handled when equipment fails, or the times at which
such failures may have occurred. They may even fail to
disclose this information to customers who are
disputing a transaction.
Where the transaction value is low, and the costs of
communications are high, it may be cost-effective to not
attempt to contact the issuer at all. This is especially
likely to happen in international transactions, but the
prevalence is decreasing because of improved reliability
and the lower cost of data communications. Each type
of intermediate party is able to check different aspects
of the transaction. For instance, some have the keys to
verify the ARQC and TC, some can verify the PIN (for ATM
transactions), some can check if the card is reported
stolen, and some may not be able to check any of these.
Issuers will have different policies on which types of
intermediate party is able to perform stand-in
authorization. In addition to establishing liability,
contracts will also impose service level agreements that
will set out the speed by which an authorization
message must be processed, and in such a manner
control the circumstances in which stand-in processing
is appropriate.
Fallback
Another set of vulnerabilities exist because the
magnetic stripe system is still operational, even with
Chip & PIN cards. UK cards continue to have magnetic
stripes, to enable them to work in terminals and ATMs
without chip readers (e.g. outside the UK), or when the
chip or chip reader has failed. UK PoS terminals also
have magnetic stripe readers for use with foreign cards
or as a backup when the chip cannot be read. This
means a criminal who cannot clone a chip can simply
copy the magnetic stripe from a smart card, and
produce a magnetic stripe clone. From the perspective
of an ATM or PoS terminal, this clone will appear to be a
legitimate card, but the chip on the card might be
damaged, or the chip reader in the terminal might have
failed. Since chips regularly break and chip readers
frequently get dirty and fail, this is not very suspicious,
and the transaction may be permitted to proceed
regardless. This is known as a ‘fallback transaction’.
The criminal does not have to read the magnetic
stripe to clone the card, because the chip contains a
copy of the data on the magnetic stripe. This data is
also commonly sent to the issuer during a transaction.
Therefore a criminal who can read the chip or intercept
the communication between a terminal and the issuer,
can also copy the magnetic stripe. A criminal who can
intercept the communication between the PoS terminal
and chip can copy the same data, and also can obtain
the PIN entered by the customer, as it is sent to the chip
during card-holder verification. PoS terminals have
tamper resistance measures to prevent this, but due to
design errors, it is quite simple to circumvent the
protection in place and connect a ‘tap’ built with off-the-
shelf electronic components.18 This device reads all the
information necessary to produce a cloned magnetic
stripe card and use it in an ATM. Chip & PIN terminals
have even been discovered with taps having been
added during or soon after manufacture.19 For these
reasons, more recent cards do not store the full CVV on
the chip, instead replacing it with an alternative termed
the ‘iCVV’.
This general approach has been widely exploited for
committing both fraudulent ATM and PoS transactions.
For instance, Maxwell Parsons was convicted in
November 2006 of having collected card details by
connecting a MP3 player to the back of ATMs. With this
information he was able to produce cloned cards, and
use them to perform unauthorized transactions.20 In
18 Saar Drimer, Steven J. Murdoch, and Ross
Anderson, Thinking Inside the Box: System-Level
Failures of Tamper Proofing, Proceedings of the
2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
(2008, IEEE Computer Society Washington, DC,
USA), 281–295, available at http://www.cl.cam
.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-711.pdf. A
demonstration of this attack on a Chip & PIN
terminal was filmed by BBC Newsnight, and aired
on 26 February 2008, 22:30, BBC Two.
19 Henry Samuel, ‘Chip and pin scam ‘has netted
millions from British shoppers’’, The Daily
Telegraph, 10 October 2008,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/polit
ics/lawandorder/3173346/Chip-and-pin-scam-has-
netted-millions-from-British-shoppers.html.
20 ‘Cash machine bug scam expert jailed’,
Manchester Evening News, 15 November 2006,
http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/s/
228/228286_cash_machine_bug_scam_expert_jail
ed.html; Stephen Mason, editor, Electronic
Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery & Admissibility,
4.10.
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22 Stephen Bates, ‘Couple who took £61,000 from
faulty ATM sentenced’, The Guardian, 21 April
2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/
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October 2008, Anup Patel was convicted of committing
fraud to the value of £2 million. This was achieved by
defeating the physical protection put in place to protect
Chip & PIN terminals, and to record both PINs and card
details. This attack was so successful that it enabled
cloned magnetic stripe cards to be produced.21
Back-end failures
The description of the vulnerabilities in the section
above assumed that the back-end systems controlled by
the card issuer, together with other processing
infrastructure, operate correctly. However, if the bank
systems are not perfectly designed and correctly
operated, these assumptions will not be true. It is likely
that there may be weaknesses in the card processing
infrastructure because of the complexity of the system,
and because it is continually being upgraded to
accommodate new equipment and additional
operational requirements. A recent illustration of a
failure was demonstrated where a couple in Essex, UK,
discovered that they could withdraw cash from a
particular ATM without the transaction being recorded
against their account. Even though these transactions
should have been declined because the couple’s
account was overdrawn, a failure at some point in the
processing allowed them to be accepted. This failure
eventually became public when the couple were
convicted, having withdrawn over £61,000 in this way.22
For online transactions, if the ARQC or TC is wrong,
the issuer should decline a transaction, and for offline
transactions an incorrect TC should be detected when
the terminal goes online at a later time, the fraud
discovered, and the customer refunded. In this way,
customers should not lose money from the use of yes-
card attacks, although for offline fraud, the merchant
will probably have to pay once the fraudulent
transaction is reversed. But if the issuer fails to detect
an ARQC or TC which was generated with the wrong key,
or contains the wrong information, the use of a yes-card
or wedge attacks will not be detected for online or
offline transactions. This failure could occur simply
because of a programming error, but it could also be an
intentional decision; for example if the HSMs which
validate the ARQC and TC are overloaded, the issuer
may decide to accept transactions without checking.
Also, in some circumstances, the ARQC or TC will be
corrupted before being sent to the issuer; in these
situations the issuer may decide to accept the
transaction rather than risk insulting the customer by
declining it, and accept the risk of fraud. Such
corruption can occur due to random errors, or because
of a format translation error such as the one believed to
be the reason that Visa debited customers’ accounts by
US$23 quadrillion.23
Because almost all UK cards, ATMs and PoS terminals
have been upgraded to support Chip & PIN, it is
common for the issuer to automatically decline fallback
transactions on cards which have a chip when used in
the UK. However, a failure in processing may also allow
a fallback transaction to succeed when it should be
declined. This could be because the issuer is informed
that a fallback transaction has occurred, but a software
bug causes it to be accepted. Alternatively, a bug in the
ATM or PoS terminal may cause it to identify a fallback
transaction as a chip transaction, and the authorization
system does not decline the transaction on the basis of
it having a missing or incorrect ARQC or TC.
Alternatively, a criminal could modify the ‘service code’
on the magnetic stripe to indicate the card does not
have a chip, and hence a fallback transaction should be
permitted. The issuer should detect the tampered
service code, but in 2005 someone working for the
London Programme made a magnetic stripe clone or a
smart card, altered the service code, and successfully
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used it for an ATM cash withdrawal.24
Logging failures
Most banking systems produce extensive log files that
record their actions, which makes it easier to identify
malfunctions and understand the cause. When
transactions are disputed by the customer, these logs
may be examined. However, the systems which produce
the log files are complex, and their output often requires
further processing before it can be easily understood. It
is therefore common to have reporting systems, which
take the raw log input (potentially from multiple
sources), interpret them, and produce a new file which
is intended to be easier to understand. A failure in
either logging or reporting systems could cause the
result of a transaction to be misinterpreted; for example
the operator may believe it to be a Chip & PIN
transaction when in fact it was fallback. If a malicious
person has gained access to logging or reporting
systems, they could also tamper with the result in order
to cover their tracks, because these systems are
commonly less well protected than authorization
systems.
Even after a reporting system has processed a log file,
it can still be difficult to interpret the output. Output is
generally presented using terse codes, and their
meaning must be found within documentation.
Sometimes this documentation is not available, or it
may be out-of-date following changes to the system
concerned. Therefore, the operator may interpret them
by comparing the log output with similar output
observed in the past, and then they may draw
conclusions. For example, in the case Job v Halifax plc,25
the witness for the bank examined the format of the log
entry of the disputed transaction, and pointed out that it
was similar to other legitimate Chip & PIN transactions,
and different from other legitimate fallback
transactions. From this, the witness inferred the
disputed transaction must have been a legitimate Chip
& PIN transaction. The bank did not refer to any
documentation on the meaning of the data, or discuss
what the log entry would look like should one or more
security checks have failed.
PIN verification
As discussed with respect to the yes-card attack, for
PoS transactions, the card is responsible for verifying
the PIN, and if a cloned card is used, the criminal need
not know the correct PIN. In contrast for ATM
transactions, the PIN is sent back to the issuer or a
stand-in processor for verification. Even so, the criminal
would not need to know the correct PIN if a stand-in
processor that cannot verify the PIN authorizes the
transaction. If there is a malfunction which allows
transactions to be authorized if the PIN verification is
not attempted or fails, a card could be used without the
correct PIN. An insider may also try to trigger such
failures, for example by gaining access to the
authorization system.
Terminal failures
The discussion above has been about failures of the
processing and authorization systems. These are very
important, because the correct functioning of these
systems is of critical importance to the integrity of the
Chip & PIN system. PoS terminals and ATMs are relied
upon to a lesser extent because they are under the
control of potentially untrustworthy merchants, and
their correct functioning cannot be guaranteed. It is for
this reason they are tamper resistant, to prevent
malicious people from extracting confidential
information (although these measures can easily be
overcome as noted above, and criminals have been
caught doing so). Nevertheless it is still possible to
commit fraud because the terminal fails to operate
properly.
During transaction authorization, the PoS terminal or
ATM generates an unpredictable number. The number is
sent to the card, and incorporated into the
cryptographic process which generates the TC and
ARQC. If this number is predictable, a criminal could
clone a card by asking the legitimate card for a number
of TC and ARQC cryptograms, then writing these values
to a generic smart card. This clone could then be used
for a transaction, and provided the thief guessed a
correct value for the unpredictable number, the clone
can produce a TC and ARQC which will pass the check
by the issuer. In this way, the criminal can put through
online Chip & PIN transactions at both PoS and ATMs,
given only temporary access to the legitimate card. The
criminal may, however, need to know the correct PIN if
cryptograms are required that indicate that card-holder
verification succeeded.
While there are well established techniques for
24 Chip and PIN security flaw uncovered, London
Programme, ITV1 London, 15 March 2005,
19:30–20:00.
25 Job v Halifax plc, Nottingham County Court (case
number 7BQ00307), 30 April 2009, the judgment is
published on page 235.
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27 A. Theodore Markettos and Simon W. Moore, The
Frequency Injection Attack on Ring-Oscillator-
Based True Random Number Generators,
Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and
Embedded Systems, LNCS 5747, September 2009
(Springer).
28 Cedric Ingrand, ‘French credit card hacker
convicted’, The Register, 26 February 2000.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2000/02/26/french_cr
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29 Personal communication.
30 Michael Stonebraker and Michael L. Brodie,
Migrating Legacy Systems: Gateways, Interfaces &
the Incremental Approach, (Morgan Kaufmann
Publishers, 1995).
31 Professor Jacques-Louis Lions and others, Ariane
501 Inquiry Board report, ESA, 19 July 1996:
http://esamultimedia.esa.int/docs/esa-x-
1819eng.pdf.
securely generating unpredictable numbers, it is
notoriously difficult to verify whether a generator is
working correctly, so failures do regularly occur. For
example, one version of Linux had a feature which was
supposed to generate unpredictable random numbers,
but was in fact relatively easy to predict. This flaw was
introduced in 2006, but remained undetected until
2008.26 Linux is used in both ATMs and PoS terminals,
but it is not clear whether such devices ran an affected
version. A criminal can also tamper with an ATM or PoS
terminal to reduce the unpredictability of the random
number generator. Research has shown that it might not
even be necessary to open the device to do so;
manipulating the power supply or transmitting a radio
signal may be sufficient.27
Whistleblowing and insiders
Examples of security failures in banking systems are
hard to find for a variety of reasons, such as the
restrictions imposed by non-disclosure agreements; the
banks are reluctant to admit vulnerabilities and the
complexity of systems, thus making it challenging to
discover vulnerabilities in the first place. The examples
discussed above became public either because a
customer noticed, or because of legal proceedings. In
other fields, most notably safety critical systems such
as aerospace and medical equipment, there are legal
requirements on companies to report failures, and to
investigate serious failures. The banks are not subject to
such requirements; only whistleblowers and
researchers acting outside the banking system can
notify the public of problems.
However, there are substantial obstacles to this. For
example, a French engineer, Serge Humpich, discovered
a way to make forged banking smart cards, and
reported this to the banks involved. Having
demonstrated his technique worked by purchasing ten
Paris Metro tickets at the request of the banks, he was
arrested and convicted for counterfeiting.28 Also, a
journalist in the UK whom the author assisted with
reporting on vulnerabilities in Chip & PIN was
threatened by his own bank that they might cancel his
mortgage (though the bank in question eventually
withdrew the threat).29 Cases such as this create a
chilling effect, preventing people from testing the
existence of vulnerabilities or reporting those they
become aware of.
Banking insiders who are aware of security
weaknesses may decide to exploit the vulnerability for
fraudulent purposes. They may discover the problem
directly, or be notified of it in a security testing report.
Discovering a vulnerability does not, however, require
insider information; while one of the criminals in the
Essex case referred to above worked for a bank, it is
believed they discovered the vulnerability by accident.
The ATM in question was old, which offers a possible
explanation as to how the fraud happened. In order to
integrate legacy infrastructure with new systems, an
established technique developed by Brodie and
Stonebreaker is to build a ‘gateway’,30 which translates
between the old and new conventions, but potentially
loses information in the process. This component is
then modified to fix bugs until it passes the necessary
tests.
Integrating legacy systems is notoriously difficult, and
tests cannot be guaranteed to find every problem.
Although it can only be hypothesized that this class of
flaw allowed the fraud, another example of where
integrating a legacy component causes failure is with
the Ariane 5 satellite launch vehicle. Here, despite
extremely rigorous testing, an integration problem
between software originally designed for Ariane 4 and
the Ariane 5 navigation system remained undiscovered,
until it caused a failure soon after launch, destroying the
rocket.31 The writers of the software made assumptions
that were true at the time the component was designed,
but were invalidated when the surrounding system was
upgraded, leading to its catastrophic failure.
Evidence in Chip & PIN cases
When a transaction is disputed, there may be
disagreement between the customer and the bank as to
who should be liable for it. A common example is where
the bank believes that a customer’s real card and PIN
have been used, and hence argues that either the
customer performed the transaction (and is attempting
to defraud the bank), or has been negligent in
protecting their card or PIN or both card and PIN. The
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customer may believe that they did not carry out the
transaction, and they were not negligent with their card
or PIN, and argue that the transaction is due to an error
having been made by the bank, or a security
vulnerability having been exploited by criminals.
Evidence may be requested to corroborate each party’s
position, but drawing conclusions from it must be
performed with care. The evidence itself could be
insufficient, and mistakes in interpretation might be
made. Also, bank employees might try to cover up
embarrassing security failures, and criminals may
attempt to tamper with evidence.
Evidence can be collected from all the systems that
have been discussed in this article, commonly in the
form of log files. These include the manufacture and
personalization facilities, where the chips are produced,
placed on cards and loaded with data. The PoS terminal
or ATM will also contain a log, generally on paper and
informally called the ‘till-roll’, which records
transactions and other important events. The card itself
also contains useful information, such as the ATC, but
depending on the bank, there may also be summary
information available about transactions. The most
important logs are kept at the authorization centre,
recording the type of transaction and result of
authorization. However, because there is potential for
errors in all of these items due to mistakes or
tampering, it is prudent to collect as much evidence as
possible in order to show that records are consistent.
Audit and compliance
Another way to establish the reliability of evidence is to
examine whether the system producing the logs was
operating correctly. This is commonly achieved through
an audit, where experts (possibly internal to the bank or
external) will examine documentation or the system
itself (or both the documentation and the system), and
check it against requirements. The result of the audit is
a report, which can be very informative as to the
dependability of the system. If any potential problems
are identified, it will highlight these, and where an
external audit is undertaken (by a payment system for
instance), the auditor may require the bank to
undertake changes. However, if a vulnerability
discovered by a payment system is considered to only
affect the bank itself and not other members of the
scheme, it may be possible for the bank not to deal with
the problem and accept the risk.
Not only is the report itself important, but also the
changes which were carried out in response to the
report. For each change, there should be information on
how and when the modification was applied, and how it
was established that the modification properly fixed the
issue that was identified. The methodology for
performing the audit is also significant, because
approaches vary in how effective they are at identifying
problems. One very effective technique is penetration
testing, where a skilled team are given access to the
system and given the task of finding security
vulnerabilities in any way they see fit. At another
extreme, some audits only examine documentation and
not the system itself, and so will miss implementation
errors. However, regardless of the methodology, audits
do miss critical vulnerabilities; for example the OpenSSL
cryptographic library was subjected to an extensive
audit under the FIPS 140-2 scheme, and passed, even
though a serious security vulnerability existed in the
random number generator.32
Logs of changes to bank systems are important, even
if modifications were not the result of an audit report.
This is especially true if the modification was known to
have an effect on security, but even apparently
innocuous changes can cause security vulnerabilities
which are hard to identify. Obtaining documentary
evidence is important because there may be a dispute,
even within a bank, as to when a particular change is
32 OpenSSL FIPS Object Module Vulnerabilities, 29
November 2007, http://www.openssl.org/news/
secadv_20071129.txt.
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made. For example, in the case of Job v Halifax plc, a
number of dates were given as to when magnetic stripe
transactions were disabled. The witness for Halifax, Ian
Brown, stated in paragraph 5.4 of his statement dated 6
February 2008, that ‘If the transaction is presented in
‘fallback’ mode, then the transaction will be declined.’
The inference of this comment was that Halifax had
disabled fallback before February 2006 (the date of the
disputed transactions). The expert witness for Halifax
plc, David Baker (Head of the APACS Cards Technical
Unit), stated in paragraph 5.1 of his second expert’s
report dated 14 February 2008 that ‘To our knowledge
all UK issuers will routinely decline transactions flagged
as magnetic stripe read and have been doing so since
2005.’ When Mr Brown gave evidence, his barrister
questioned him about the statement he made in
paragraph 5.1, and he amended his evidence to the
effect that the comments he made were correct in
September 2006. The author has confirmed that some
banks permitted fallback as late as May 2007.33
One explanation for this discrepancy is that there can
be a delay between when a change is mandated, and
when it is actually applied; this has also been seen with
iCVV, which APACS announced to be fully in place by
2008:34
‘All UK issued cards issued after 1 January 2008
include an updated iCVV (Integrated Circuit Card
Verification Value) which means that if one of these
cards were compromised in the method described,
the data would be useless to the fraudster (i.e. a fake
magnetic stripe card created via a compromise of this
type would not work in a cash machine, even overseas
in a non-chip and PIN country).’
The author has confirmed that several banks, including
Halifax Bank of Scotland (with a card issued in March
2008) and Barclays (with a card issued in February
2008), have not implemented iCVV, and they were still
issuing cards that do not comply with the iCCV standard
past this date.
Before a card transaction can take place, the chip
must be manufactured and the software loaded. Logs
from this process will be useful to establish which
version of the chip hardware and EMV software was
used. Internal audit reports may indicate if any versions
were known to be vulnerable to attack. Even if these
audit reports do not exist, it would be informative to
examine the ‘change log’ documentation accompanying
the chip software, as this should indicate the
differences between versions. If this documentation
indicates that a new version of software was released in
order to fix a bug in a prior version, the possibility that
such a bug would allow a fraudulent transaction should
be investigated.
The personalization process is another area in which
logs would be valuable, for example whether a cloned
card was produced because the first one might
apparently fail quality assurance. Procedures should
also be examined, to ensure that cryptographic keys are
being safely handled. Also, audit reports and change
logs for the software which configures cards should be
examined, to ensure it properly locks the card to protect
confidential data.
Logs of the transaction and authorization process will
be available from a number of places, and the
information they contain will be somewhat different.
The ATM or PoS terminal will be able to indicate
whether the transaction that is in dispute actually took
place, and how it was authorized. However,
interpretation of these can be difficult. For example, in
the Essex fraud case, the bank that operated the ATM
originally believed that members of staff were stealing
the money. This suspicion must have arisen because
logs are maintained of how much money was loaded
into the ATM and how much was withdrawn, and the
totals were inconsistent. In fact, the CCTV surveillance
put in place to catch the thief, actually showed the
couple who were later convicted.
During the authorization process, messages are sent
via a number of intermediate parties: the acquiring bank
who is contacted by the merchant; the issuer (or stand-
in processor) which generates the authorization; and
the payment system which allows acquiring banks and
issuers to communicate and transfer funds. All of these
parties probably keep logs, especially the payment
system. This is because they are responsible for
providing the communication infrastructure, and they
also offer dispute resolution services between their
members. In these cases, where there is an
inconsistency in the records of two members, the
payment system can examine their logs to establish the
facts. The logs of payment systems are particularly
valuable in this case, because they are from a neutral
party. Similarly, in the case of customer disputes,
collecting logs from a third party increases the chance
RELIABILITY OF CHIP & PIN EVIDENCE IN BANKING DISPUTES
112 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6 © Pario Communications Limited, 2009
of detecting insider attacks.
Transaction authentication is the most important step
of the EMV transaction, and for this stage the logs are
kept with the issuer. These should include a description
of the transaction, the result of authorization, and the
cryptograms involved (ARQC, TC, and ARPC). The
description should include all the usual information,
such as the amount and date, but also will have the
result of card-holder verification, and importantly
whether PIN verification was attempted and whether it
succeeded. Two versions of this are given: one by the
terminal in its description of the transaction, and one by
the card as part of the ARQC and TC, in its issuer
application data section (IAD). These should be
compared to establish consistency. Because of the
cryptographic processing, these logs can be subjected
to enhanced verification, but they do not replace the
other logs discussed above, because they do not
contain all the necessary information and still can be
tampered with.
Principles for design of secure systems
In the field of computer security, the Trusted Computing
Base (TCB) is the part of a system which must be relied
upon in order for the overall system to function securely.
A widely accepted principle of security engineering is to
minimize the size of the TCB, in order to improve the
robustness of the system.35 Following this principle
means that during the design and implementation of a
system, the available testing resources can be focused
more intensely on the TCB, increasing the chances of
identifying bugs. Additionally, this principle aids
forensic analysis, because if a component can be shown
to be outside the TCB, there is no need to waste effort in
establishing whether it is functioning correctly. In EMV,
there is no clearly defined TCB, but analyzing the
system from this perspective is a helpful way of
deciding what system components should be examined
and what they can be relied upon for.
In disputed transaction cases, the issuer will typically
have almost all the evidence that is presented to the
court or adjudicator. Sometimes audit reports are made
public, as occurs for the banking smart cards issued in
Germany and evaluated under the Common Criteria
scheme.36 However, in banking, it is more common to
keep audit reports and system documentation secret
than in other areas of security engineering.
In discussing what evidence should be presented,
there may be a question as to whether a bank, by giving
an opposing expert witness access to an item of
information, would harm the security of the system. An
accepted best practice in security engineering is that
the security of a robust system should not depend on
secrecy of its design. This is because it is difficult to
keep design documents secret, and if the detailed
functionality of a system cannot be described, questions
may be raised as to whether it is in fact secure. It is for
this reason that it is common to openly publish details
of security systems, often including the source code
from which they are built. Even if source code is not
published (e.g. Microsoft Windows), lists of known
security flaws are publically available.
This practice is historically known as Kerkhoffs’
principle,37 where it was applied to military
communication systems. With respect to banking
systems, the same principle is described by APACS (the
UK banking industry representative body), in their PIN
Administration Policy:38
‘The PIN Administration process must not only be
secure, but also be demonstrably secure. If PIN
Security is publicly challenged, either in the media or
in a court of law, it must be possible to respond to
such a challenge and for the response to be
supported with evidence. Furthermore, the use of that
evidence in the public domain must not in itself
compromise security.’
Verifying authorization logs
If there is a disputed Chip & PIN transaction, it can
safely be assumed that the bank authorization system
shows that the correct card and PIN were used
(otherwise the customer would be immediately
refunded). In which case, the next step in examining the
evidence would be to establish whether these logs can
be relied upon in concluding that the customer’s card
and PIN were used. Some generic approaches have
been described above, such as corroborating different
items of evidence and examining documentation
relating to the systems relied upon. However, there is
one particularly useful set of techniques which can be
applied to authorization system logs, because the EMV
35 Butler Lampson, Martín Abadi, Michael Burrows
and Edward Wobber, ‘Authentication in Distributed
Systems: Theory and Practice’, ACM Transactions
on Computer Systems, Volume 12, Issue 1
(February 1994) (ACM Press), http://research.
microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/blampson/45-
authenticationtheoryandpractice/acrobat.pdf.
36 Certification Report for ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.2,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0341-2006, 13 June 2006 (BSI),
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/
0341a.pdf.
37 Auguste Kerckhoffs, ‘La cryptographie militaire’,
Journal des sciences militaires, 9 January 1883,
http://www.petitcolas.net/fabien/kerckhoffs/.
38 APACS PIN Administration Policy, January 2004
(APACS), http://www.apacs.org.uk/resources
_publications/documents/PIN_Administration_Poli
cy.pdf.
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39 The author assisted in this case by attempting to
read the ATC from the card; however the bank had
electronically disabled the card before returning it
to the customer. The customer did not take the
case further than the bank’s internal dispute
resolution process.
cryptograms act as a audit log, allowing their
authenticity to be established without having to rely on
the authorization system.
Validating the ATC
The simplest item to validate is the ATC, which is sent
along with each cryptogram. It will therefore be stored
in the authorization system, and may also be recorded
by the payment system and at the PoS terminal or ATM.
The ATC is a number stored by the card, and
incremented by one each time a transaction is initiated.
Therefore, logs of transactions should show the ATC
increasing by one for each transaction, in chronological
order of the transaction time. The ATC may pass over
values if a transaction is initiated but aborted before the
cryptogram is sent to the issuer, but it should never
decrease. Large jumps should be viewed with suspicion.
It is important to examine the ATC sequence for both
disputed and non-disputed transactions, because if a
clone is being used, and a criminal is not very careful,
there will be inconsistencies in the pattern. For example,
suppose the criminal creates a cloned card and uses it
for a transaction. If the ATC produced for this fraudulent
transaction is lower or equal to that of the last
legitimate one, logs of ATC values would show up a
discrepancy. Even if the criminal is able to guess the
correct value of the ATC to use, the logs will still show a
discrepancy when the customer next uses the legitimate
card, unless it happened to leave out a value due to an
aborted transaction.
While the authorization system should detect grossly
irregular sequences of ATC values, when investigating
disputed transactions, it is advisable to perform more
rigorous examination of the information than the
authorization system would normally perform. This is
because criminals will generally attempt to circumvent
the fraud detection measures, but no more (so as not to
waste effort). If the process of analyzing logs for
disputed transactions is merely to repeat the same
checks which it would have had to pass in order for the
transaction to succeed, no new type of fraud would ever
be detected. Authorization systems might also not
enforce tight constraints; for example the author has
tested cards which have worked despite large gaps in
the ATC sequences.
However, the criminal can still circumvent the process
if he has access to the legitimate card. First, the criminal
uses the cloned card a few times while the customer is
not using the legitimate one. Then the thief obtains the
legitimate card, increments the ATC the same number of
times that he used the cloned one, adds a few more
additional ones, and then returns it to the customer.
Finally, the criminal can use the cloned card more times,
provided that its ATC remains less than the one he set
on the legitimate card. In this way, the thief can
interleave two groups of fraudulent transactions,
without causing disruption to the pattern of ATC values.
With more regular access to the legitimate card, the
criminal could effect further fraudulent transactions.
EMV cards can, optionally, contain a record of the ATC
value when the card last successfully completed online
transaction authentication. This value can be used to
help detect whether a criminal has incremented the ATC
as described above; in such a case, there would be a
significant gap between ATC and the last online ATC.
Many UK cards have this feature enabled, and it has
proved a useful forensic tool. Another optional feature
which would be especially useful for investigating
disputed transactions is the transaction log. Here, the
card maintains a record of recent transactions, and will
return the list when requested. Unfortunately, the
author is not aware of any UK bank which has adopted
this feature.
Even without the optional additions, the ATC is a useful
tool in validating transaction logs, and the interleaving of
disputed transactions with non-disputed ones, with a
consistent ATC pattern, was used by the First Trust Bank
as evidence against their customer in a disputed ATM
withdrawal case.39 While the ATC logs are held by the bank
(and potentially other parties), the customer can partially
validate this information himself, because ATC values are
sometimes printed on receipts. Additionally, if the
customer has retained the card which his bank states was
used for the disputed transactions, he or someone acting
for him can read the current ATC value using specially
designed software. The author has attempted to do this in
three cases so far, but in two the issuer instructed that the
card be destroyed (in one case by the customer, and in the
other by the bank which had retained the card in an ATM),
and in the third, the bank sent a message to the card
instructing it to permanently disable itself before the
author could obtain access to the card.
Validating the cryptogram
A further item that can be validated is the cryptogram
(ARQC or TC or both). First, having a cryptogram
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contributes towards evidence that it was a Chip & PIN
transaction, not fallback. The transaction data which
accompanies the cryptogram includes the type of
transaction, date, value, etc. as seen by the card, which
should be compared against the version that was sent
to the issuer. Most important is the IAD, which is
generated by the card and incorporates details on
whether the PIN was entered correctly, and if the card
has detected any unusual activity. This is the only way
to verify whether card-holder verification succeeded;
because of the wedge attack, the PoS terminal may
have been misled. The detailed meaning of the IAD is
specific to the issuer, but it generally follows one of the
standards produced by Visa, Mastercard, or the EMV
consortium.
However, the records of both the IAD and ATC could
be manipulated by the authorization, reporting, or
logging systems and networks, so they cannot be
trusted unless the reliability of these can be assured.
But following from the principle of minimizing the
trusted computing base, it is possible to eliminate
consideration of these systems by validating the
authentication code using independently implemented
software, based on the public standards for cryptogram
generation (such as one written by the author).40
Checking a cryptogram requires the UDK of the card,
which needs to be kept confidential while the card is
active, but after the card is cancelled it can be safely
disclosed. This is because knowing the UDK of one card
is of no assistance in discovering the UDK of another.
This key could, for example, be obtained by requesting
the HSM, which generates keys for personalizing newly
issued cards, to generate a key for just one card. The
key can also be validated by checking an ARQC
generated by the card (if the customer still holds it), or
receipts which show the ARQC or TC.
Nature of disputes
From the above description, it is clear that the
complexity of EMV substantially changes the nature of
disputes between customers and banks over
unauthorized transactions. While the addition of
cryptography offers greater resistance to fraud, this also
makes it more likely that customers will be denied
refunds by their bank. Not many of these cases make it
to court in the UK, because the sums the customers
claim for are typically a few hundred to a few thousand
pounds, and the claimant risks an order to pay costs
that can be significant, should they lose. For example, in
Job v Halifax plc, the disputed transaction was £2,100,
but the bank proved their case to the satisfaction of the
judge, and Mr Job was ordered to pay £15,000 in costs.
Prosecutions also occur, such as that of Jane Badger,
who disputed a transaction and was subsequently
charged with making a false statement. She was
acquitted, but at the time of writing, the bank (Egg)
continues to refuse to refund the disputed transaction.
Despite only a few cases making it to court, the
consumer rights organization Which? reports that 20 per
cent of customers are not refunded after claiming to be
the victim of fraud.41 There are difficulties with the way
customers can seek a resolution in respect of disputed
transactions. Initially, they have to defer to the bank’s
internal dispute resolution process, and then consider
adjudication by the Financial Services Ombudsman.
However, the customer is in a fairly weak position,
because neither the bank nor the Financial Services
Ombudsman produces the evidence, unless the
customer makes a request under the provisions of the
Data Protection Act 1998. The Banking Code is also not
very helpful. It states that banks are liable for fraudulent
transactions, but this only applies if the bank believes
the customer has been either negligent nor is acting
fraudulently. A common position taken by banks over
disputed transactions is that if a transaction is Chip &
PIN, and it does not match the standard patterns of
known frauds, then the customer is considered liable.
However, the criteria banks use for identifying patterns
are not subject to public scrutiny, and may vary between
banks and individual fraud investigators.
Another frequent problem during disputes is that
evidence is destroyed by the time the case is
adjudicated or when legal proceedings are initiated. As
mentioned above, in the cases where the author has
attempted to read the ATC from cards, the bank has
requested that this evidence be destroyed. This appears
to be standard procedure, but seems to be unwise now
that cards can contain useful forensic evidence.
Similarly, in the case of Job v Halifax plc, the transaction
logs which included the ARQC were destroyed by Halifax
after 180 days, even though the transactions were in
dispute. Since there was only one log of the transaction
presented as evidence, any inconsistency which might
have existed would not have been detected. While the
40 The author wrote this software in order to be able
to verify any cryptograms that might have been
produced in Job v Halifax plc. It is not, as yet,
publicly available.
41 ‘Fraud victims struggle to get money back: One in
five financial fraud victims not reimbursed’,
Which?, 25 June 2009, http://www.which.co.uk
/news/2009/06/fraud-victims-struggle-to-get-
money-back-179150.jsp.
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42 BBC Watchdog, 6 February 2007, 19:00, BBC One.
43 Submission to the Hunt Review of the Financial
Ombudsman Service, Foundation for Information
Policy Research, 16 January 2008,
http://www.fipr.org/080116huntreview.pdf.
judgment in Job v Halifax plc went in the bank’s favour,
the judge cautioned that in future cases, the fact that a
bank destroys evidence may be considered differently
by another judge in different circumstances.
Obtaining evidence held by third parties can also be
problematic, such as CCTV footage. A common scenario
is that upon reporting a disputed transaction to their
bank, a customer is immediately refunded. The
customer is then satisfied with the outcome, and does
not take the case further. Simultaneously, an internal
investigation is initiated by the bank, which could take
many weeks. If this investigation decides against the
customer, the refund will be reversed. At this point, the
customer will be motivated to obtain CCTV evidence and
logs from third parties, but by this stage they may have
been deleted. Even if they still exist, the CCTV owner
may only respond to an application by the police, and
since April 2007 the police will only investigate if
requested to do so by the bank. From the bank’s
perspective, a case in which the customer has had their
refund denied is resolved, so they are unlikely to take
any further action.
These problems have led to many customers
contacting the press, and stories on Chip & PIN attract
high levels of interest from their audiences. Investigative
journalists have worked with researchers in order to
discover and demonstrate security vulnerabilities. In
some cases they have also contacted bank insiders and
reformed criminals to ask for assistance. In this respect,
the press performs a valuable role by protecting sources
from potential recrimination. The media can also be
helpful in obtaining refunds for disputed transactions. For
example, Barclays refunded Suzanne Lewis £1,400
following the intervention of BBC Watchdog in February
2007.42
The Financial Ombudsman has been criticized for
accepting assurances from the banks that Chip & PIN
cards cannot be cloned.43 The banks’ opinion is based
on their experience that criminals have not been caught
either using cloned Chip & PIN cards, or exploiting
failures in authorization systems. Care must be taken to
ensure that such arguments are not circular: if the
definition of a cloned card is one which will evade
detection by the bank’s anti-fraud measures, then of
course they will not have been caught by banks.
Similarly, in this article, a number of examples of
failures in bank computer systems and procedures have
been given, that have become public only because
either the customer reported the problem, or there was
an associated criminal prosecution. Even though these
cases are not complete explanations for how cloned
smart cards could be produced, it might be that others
exist which have not become public, and which could be
exploited by criminals.
Conclusion
A theme throughout this article has been that Chip &
PIN greatly increases the complexity of banking
systems. This helps deter criminals, but also greatly
increases the amount of preparation work necessary
when disputed transactions involving Chip & PIN are the
subject of litigation. The fact that logs, CCTV footage,
and other useful information may be destroyed
suggests that requests to preserve evidence should be
sent and pursued quickly, even if the disputed
transaction is initially reversed. For this reason, and so
that opportunities to challenge the evidence are not
missed, it is also prudent for customers disputing
transactions to obtain legal representation early on in
their case.
On the technical side of disputes, the complexity of
Chip & PIN offers both advantages and difficulties. The
extra evidence available can, potentially, help support a
particular interpretation, but the technical nature of the
evidence is such that it needs greater precision and
effort to interpret and analyze. However, for the
evidence to be subject to analysis and interpretation, it
must be disclosed. In addition, it is also necessary to
adduce sufficient information to establish its reliability,
and what conclusions may safely be drawn from it. This
presents challenges both to litigators and expert
witnesses. It is anticipated that this article provides
assistance to both these audiences, should they be
involved in such a case.
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